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1 Debates about the viability of direct democracy are common in both the United States
and in Europe. Proponents argue that direct democracy provides citizens with a means
of  democratic  self-defense  with  which  to  combat  rigid  political  machines,  the
corrupting influence of powerful economic players, and the gridlock of non-consensual
politics. Detractors argue on the contrary that direct democracy can lead to chaotic
policy  changes,  irresponsible  political  decisions,  and ironically  an increased role  of
moneyed interests in writing ballot measures and influencing votes. These opposing
positions create intense and heated discussion not only among alert citizens and other
players in the field of  politics,  but among academics.  What exactly do we mean by
direct democracy? Does its meaning change according to its context? Can it function to
the benefit of ordinary citizens? Or, does rather it prove the adage, “the road to hell is
paved  with  good  intentions?”  This  volume  addresses  these  questions  with  an
examination of direct democracy in the United States, focusing especially on California,
and in the European Union, Italy, Switzerland, and France.
2 Brought together here are analyses of select American and European systems of direct
democracy  as  presented  by  American  historians  and  French  legal  scholars.  This
diversity reveals in very concrete ways the significant divergences in outlook to be
found when crossing cultures, disciplines, and languages. Beyond the use of the French
or the American English language and corresponding writing styles, which themselves
lead to structural differences in communication, these articles demonstrate cultural
nuances  inherent  in  distinctive  ways  of  conceptualizing  and  structuring
argumentation. Surprisingly, differences in academic discipline are perhaps the least
profound. The empirical training of American political historians, grounded as it is in
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the  preeminent  weight  of  jurisprudence  in  the  American  system,  leads  to  certain
similarities  with  the  approach  taken  by  legal  scholars.  However,  the  same
consideration for jurisprudence that brings these scholars together in turn creates the
widest  divergence  between  the  American  and  European  experiences  with  direct
democracy  and  provides  a  critical  conceptual  framework  in  which  to  place  the
experiences of the United States, and in particular of California, that are presented in
this volume.
3 In  the  United  States,  direct  democracy  does  not  exist  on  the  federal  level,  but  to
varying degrees is part of the electoral process in thirty-eight states and the District of
Columbia. In American parlance, direct democracy functions in three ways, sometimes
referred to as the “trinity” of California politics: the initiative, the referendum, and the
recall. Twenty-four states plus the District of Columbia authorize ballot initiatives that
allow citizens to vote on law propositions or constitutional amendments, the texts of
which may be written by the state  legislatures,  or  in  some states  by any group or
individual. Other states allow the legislature to vote on texts proposed by citizens. (In
California, a further distinction is drawn between initiatives, written and placed on the
ballot by the state assembly, and propositions, which citizens generate directly.) The
referendum generally  allows  citizens  to  vote  in  answer  to  a  yes/no  question,  thus
accepting or rejecting a particular law or government project. Finally, the recall allows
citizens to vote to remove an elected official from office before the end of his or her
term. A petition, completed through the collection of citizen signatures, the required
number of which varies from state to state, is necessary for various ballot initiatives,
referenda, or recall elections to come before voters.
4 Direct democracy of different kinds and with clear regional variations also functions at
the city and county level throughout the United States,  where its use is  sometimes
greater than at the state level. In California for instance, not only has direct democracy
existed at the state level since 1911, but at the county level since 1893, and at the city
level beginning in 1898 when the northern California cities of San Francisco and Vallejo
were the first in the state to adopt initiative rights.1 
5 While the concept of citizens’ initiatives is provided for in the European Union’s Lisbon
Treaty (in place since December 1, 2009), because the mechanisms to put it into place
are incomplete it does not currently exist except in theoretical form. Nonetheless, six
initiatives have already been proposed with the support of over one million citizens in
the European Union and are awaiting a structure through which they can be presented
to voters (Bertrand). 
6 Direct democracy does function already in many individual European nations, in a wide
variety  of  forms  and  to  differing  degrees.  In  some  nations,  such  as  Italy  and
Switzerland, the referendum is a regular part of the democratic process. In Italy, the
popular  referendum was inscribed in  the  1947 constitution,  but  the  legal  structure
required to put referenda into place was only adopted in 1970 (Laffaille). Switzerland is
the European nation the most often associated with direct democracy, and since its
inclusion  in  the  1848  constitution,  has  had  a  long  tradition  of  citizen  proposed
initiatives and government proposed referenda, as well as an almost never used recall
(Giraux). In contrast, while the French constitution of 1958 recognizes the principle of
the referendum, government sponsored referenda are tightly hedged with restrictions
and have remained rare. Since 1995, French voters have the right to initiate referenda
on the local level, but there is no existing mechanism by which voters can actually do
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so,  thus the citizen-generated referendum remains more constitutional  theory than
practice (Dubreuil). 
7 A thumbnail comparison of these three nations would indicate that although Italian
voters  use  referenda  regularly,  sometimes  to  make  profound  alterations  to  the
structure of the political system, increased voter absenteeism since around 2000 has
made referenda less likely to pass. The Swiss are asked to vote very regularly (about
four  times  a  year),  on local,  canton-wide,  or  national  referenda with highly  varied
content,  but  the  complexity  of  the  texts  on  which  to  vote  on  have  encouraged
increasingly  low  voter  turn-outs.  In  contrast,  the  French  system  emphasizes
representative government as the most legitimate vehicle for democracy, leading to
high voter participation in elections but little citizen access to decision-making. 
8 Taken  together,  the  perspectives  presented  by  Christine  Bertrand,  Franck  Laffaille,
Denis Giraux,  and Charles-André Dubreuil  demonstrate an exceedingly cautious,  yet
somewhat  positive  view  of  the  potential  promise  of  direct  democracy  to  increase
citizen  involvement  in  decision-making  and  make  the  electoral  process  more
democratic in Europe. Criticisms are sharpest in the case of Italy, where late twentieth
century referenda actually altered the country’s political balance of power. The Swiss
model is presented as one that functions relatively well, in which citizens rather than
pressure groups propose referenda, and in which in case of the passage of texts deemed
abusive, the Swiss parliament can propose laws to modify or even counter them. 
9 Not  so  in  the  case  of  California,  where  perceived abuses  of  direct  democracy  have
prompted the Californian historians represented in these pages to cry out in warning of
its  dangers  and  risks.  In  Glen  Gendzel’s  words,  direct  democracy  in  California  has
become  a  “vivid  example  of  reform  gone  awry  and  good  intentions  leading  to
catastrophic unintended consequences.” Among these consequences, as Robert Cherny
points out, are “the ways in which direct democratic procedures have contributed to
legislative  dysfunction”  and  “restructured  governance”  in  California,  under  the
“guidance  of  advocates  of  small  government  and  the  free  market.”  William  Issel
situates the case of California direct democracy in the larger pattern of U.S. politics,
suggesting that at the same time as “increasing numbers of voters have lost faith in
government and converted to the religion of the free market in recent years, they have
once again demonstrated” ways in which “[c]ultural commitments… have periodically
rivaled economic self-interest as motivating forces in American public life.” This has
encouraged  “conservative  cultural  politics,”  in  which  activists  have  made  use  of
California’s direct democracy mechanism to pursue their agendas. These three scholars
ground the failure of direct democracy in California in the ravages they deem it has
brought to the state’s finances, governance, and social cohesion.2
10 Delving into the diverse structures, practices, and consequences of direct democracy in
California  and  in  the  European  Union,  Italy,  Switzerland,  and  France,  this  volume
presents  striking  contrasts.  This  is  but  to  be  expected,  given  the  tremendous
differences  in  history,  political  culture,  and  economic  context  in  these  divergence
places located on two continents. Yet, to paraphrase Pierre Nora, the essential task of
the  intellectual  is  to  demonstrate  the  complexity  of  what  seems  simple  and  the
simplicity of what seems complex. From such diversity in direct democracy a relatively
simple distinction between the American and European cases seems to emerge: that of
the extent to which the influence of money has intruded into the political process.3
This leads to a consideration of the role of the United States Supreme Court in allowing
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this to happen through its interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, in particular its First
Amendment, along with the phenomenon of American constitutionalism, that has led
to maintained public support for the Constitution-anchored political system, even as it
seems to move considerably away from its Early Republic and Jacksonian-era origins.
11 One of the most striking differences between U.S. and French elections, for example,
concerns the costs of campaigns and the manner in which free speech is understood. In
France, campaign advertising is tightly regulated. The only mail voters receive is an
official platform statement of each party sent together at a specified time in a single,
unmarked brown paper envelope. In contrast to the plethora of political billboards in
the United States, in France only official campaign posters, with strict guidelines as to
their size and the amount of text and image allowed, are displayed on official bulletin
boards near each election site. Although some candidates complain that their voices
are not sufficiently heard, in general they have relatively equal access to the media
through journalists or official forums, but neither they nor anyone else may purchase
advertising time. This does not mean that cases of excessive influence or of political
corruption do not exist. However, the absence of campaign advertising means that the
economic pressures exerted on the political system do not directly involve voters, but
are  largely  contained  in  the  sometimes  covert  relationships  between  powerful
individuals or groups and political parties or elected officials. The lack of advertising,
along  with  relatively  generous  government  financing  for  political  campaigns,  also
translates as a reduced cost of campaigning in France that opens the possibility for
small political parties not only to participate in, but occasionally to win elections.
12 “Congress shall make no law… abridging the freedom of speech….” In the early twenty-
first century, the U.S. Supreme Court has increasingly interpreted this passage in the
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as protecting campaign contributions as an
expression of free speech. This has been particularly the case after Congress passed and
President George W. Bush signed into law the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act,
designed  especially  to  regulate  and  limit  campaign  financing  and  advertising.  In  a
series of decisions culminating in 2010 with Citizen’s United v. Federal Election Commission,
the Court has dismantled many of  the restrictions on political  spending in election
campaigns,  essentially  by  arguing  that  the  First  Amendment  protects  the  rights  of
corporations, labor unions, or any other American group or individual to participate
financially with no limits in election campaigns as a form of free speech. In this way,
powerful economic interests participate directly in electoral politics at the national,
state, and local level, and in all forms of elections, whether for candidates, initiatives,
referenda, or recalls.4
13 Direct democracy as a political reform dates overwhelmingly to the Progressive era, a
period during which many Americans worried about the excessive influence on politics
of late nineteenth and early twentieth century businesses, in particular the railroad,
banking,  and  oil  industries.  Concerned  Progressives  regularly  decried  political
corruption  as  a  threat  to  American  democracy  and  called  for  greater  citizen
involvement in politics and increased citizen education as to the actual workings of
their republic, especially as spelled out in its framework, the U.S. Constitution. In 1924,
Solicitor General James M. Beck wrote, “the Constitution is in graver danger than at
any other time in the history of America. This is due, not to any conscious hostility to
the spirit or letter, but to the indifference and apathy with which the masses regard the
increasing assaults upon its basic principles.”5 
The Promises and Dangers of Direct Democracy: A Historical Comparison
Siècles, 37 | 2013
4
14 In 2010, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer echoed this concern: “education,
including the transmission of civic values from one generation to the next, must play
the major role in maintaining public confidence in the Court’s decisions…” However,
“the Court too must help maintain public acceptance of its own legitimacy. It can do
this best by helping ensure that the Constitution remains ‘workable’ in a broad sense of
that term. Specifically, it can and should interpret the Constitution in a way that works
for  the  people  of  America  today.”6 Breyer  thus  moves  beyond  the  Progressive  era
expectation that through civic education and by participating in direct democracy an
educated citizenry could defend democratic principles. He calls as well for the Supreme
Court  to  play  its  role  in  maintaining  the  distinctive  American  tradition  of
constitutionalism, defined by historian Michael Kammen as embodying “a set of values,
a range of options, and a means of resolving conflicts within a framework of consensus.
It  has  supplied  stability  and  continuity  to  a  degree  the  framers  [of  the  U.S.
Constitution]  could  barely  have  imagined”  and  “has  been remarkably  successful  in
safeguarding the Constitution itself,” buffering it from “our most erratic impulses.”7
15 Direct  democracy  in  the  United  States  is  embedded  in  a  workable  constitutional
heritage and a tradition of constitutionalism, and its principles can only be realized if
both of these are safeguarded by a non-politicized judiciary. The decisions made by the
Supreme Court in recent years have led to an increase in the influence of financing on
campaigns and the abuse of the democratic process by powerful players. They have also
raised charges that the court has become overly partisan in carrying out its mission of
judicial  review,  thus  weakening  the  constitutionalism  that  is  the  bedrock  of  all
American politics and government, including direct democracy.8 In the following pages,
the  merits  and  dangers  of  direct  democracy  measures  are  examined,  debated,
applauded, and denounced, revealing the many facets of this controversial approach to
political governance.
NOTES
1. For a recent discussion of  American direct  democracy,  see for example Donna Kesselman,
“Direct  Democracy  on  Election  Day:  Ballot  Measures  as  Measures  of  American  Democracy,”
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Southern California, accessed August 2012 at http://www.iandrinstitute.org.
2. Most California historians would agree that there is urgent need to reform direct democracy in
California  to  reduce  its  abuse  by  powerful  interests,  but  not  all  agree  that  it  is  beyond
redemption.  See  for  example,  Marie  Bolton  and  Nancy  C.  Unger,  “The  Case  for  Cautious
Optimism:  California  Environmental  Propositions  in  the  Late  Twentieth  Century,”  La
Californie:Périphérie  ou  laboratoire?, Annick Foucrier  and  Antoine  Coppolani,  eds.  (Paris:
L'Harmattan, 2004), 81-102.
3. See Denis Giraux below: « Alors qu’aux États-Unis, l’argent est aussi roi lors des référendums,
que les millions de dollars privés sont jetés dans ces campagnes sans pour autant garantir la
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victoire au plus dépensier, cette problématique est méconnue de ce côté de l’Atlantique au grand
étonnement des intellectuels américains qui y voient le talon d’Achille de leur démocratie. »
4. The  highly  controversial  Citizen’s  United decision  is  the  subject  of  ongoing  debate  and
interpretation.
5. James M. Beck, The Constitution of the United States: Yesterday, Today—and Tomorrow (NY, 1924)
quoted in Michael Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself: The Constitution in American Culture
(NY: Knopf, 1986), 4.
6. Stephen Breyer, America’s Supreme Court: Making Democracy Work (NY: Oxford UP, 2010), 73.
7. Kammen, 399.
8. The 2000 decision Bush v.  Gore also contributed to a growing public mistrust of the court’s
nonpartisanship.
ABSTRACTS
Delving  into  the  diverse  structures,  practices,  and  consequences  of  direct  democracy  in the
United States  and California  and in the European Union,  Italy,  Switzerland,  and France,  this
volume presents striking contrasts. French legal scholars demonstrate an exceedingly cautious,
yet  somewhat positive view of  the potential  promise of  direct  democracy to increase citizen
involvement in decision-making in Europe, while Californian historians cry out in warning of its
dangers and negative consequences. Central to the distinctions drawn between American and
European  systems  of  direct  democracy  is  the  extent  to  which  the  influence  of  money  has
intruded into the political process, as well as in the United States, the role of the U.S. Supreme
Court, and the phenomenon of American constitutionalism.
Cherchant à analyser en profondeur les différentes structures, pratiques et conséquences de la
démocratie directe aux États-Unis et plus particulièrement en Californie ainsi que dans l’Union
Européenne, en Italie, en Suisse et en France, ce numéro de Siècles donne à voir des contrastes
frappants. Si les juristes français font preuve d’une lecture très prudente – mais toutefois quelque
peu positive – quant à la promesse potentielle que contient la démocratie directe pour permettre
l’augmentation  de  la  participation  des  citoyens  dans  le  processus  décisionnel  en  Europe,  à
l’opposé,  les  historiens  californiens  se  répandent  en  avertissements  contre  ses  dangers  et
conséquences négatives. Deux éléments permettent d’éclairer les distinctions tracées entre les
systèmes  américain  et  européen  de  démocratie  directe :  d’une  part,  le  degré  d’influence  de
l’argent dans le processus politique et, d’autre part, aux États-Unis, le rôle de la Cour Suprême
des États-Unis et le phénomène du constitutionnalisme américain.
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